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Trial-Absence of Judge.
It is reversible error for the judge, during the argument of the case
before the jury, to go out of the court-room to a private room where he
cannot hear the argument nor pass on objections made by the prisoner's
counsel to the statements of the State's attorney.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John K. Thompson was indicted for assault with
intent to kill, and was convicted. During the argument
of the case before the jury, the trial judge left the court-
room and remained out of the court-room during the entire
closing argument of the State's attorney. The judge had
retired for the purpose of preparing his instructions to the
jury, but he could not, and the record shows, did not, hear
the argument to the jury.- Counsel for the defendant
repeatedly objected to the remarks of the State's attorney,
but as the judge was absent from the court-room and there
was no presiding judge present to pass upon the questions
raised, or attempted to be raised, they were never decided.
Upon these facts CRAIG, J., said: "The argument before
the jury is a part of the trial of a cause as well as the
introduction of evidence to prove the innocence or guilt of
a defendant, or any other fact at issue in the trial. If the
1 32 N. ]E . Rep., 968 (1893).
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presiding judge may leave a court-room and engage in
"other business during the argument before the jury, he
may upon the same ground leave while the evidence is
being introduced during the progress of the trial, at any
any other stage of the proceeding. . .. . Under the
law the defendant, who was on trial for a serious crime-
one which deprived him of his liberty-had the right to the
presence of the presiding judge during the argument of
the case before the jury, and the absence of the judge was,,
in our opinion, an error of sufficient magnitude to ieverse
the judgment."
MISCONDUCT oF A JUDGU AS GROUND FOR N~w TRIAL.
The purity of the judiciary is the
perpetuation of order and equality.
When the bench becomes the ob-
iect of criticism and contempt, the
death warrant will be read to an in-
stitution which the civilized world
recognizes to-day with awe and
admiration. To the honor and
credit of the judiciary, be it said
that its decorum has been,. as a
rule, worthy of its praise; but in-
stances of misconduct, legal, if not
wilful, may be noted which the
law recognizes as culpable and
affording sufficient ground for
granting a new trial.
Absence of the Judge during
Trial.-The record in Meredith v.
People, 84' IIL, 479, homicide,
shows that the judge of the Circuit
Court before whom the cause was
tried, during the argument before
the jury was absent for nearly two
days from the court-room and em-
ployed in the trial of other causes
in an adjoining room, and his
place upon the bench was occupied
successively by two members of the
bar. Justice ScoTT in setting aside
the verdict said: "It is not ma-
terial whether the judge of the
Circuit Court was absent from the
court-room during the trial of the
cause by consent of counsel for the
defense. Neither accused nor his
counsel for him could consent that
the judge of the Eourt before whom
the cause was being tried might be
elsewhere employed in other
official duties. It is no less error
than if he had been -in another
county. Where the judge is en-
gaged in trying causes, there is the
court, and he can hold no court
elsewhere by proxy at the same
time. . . . This court has de-
cided in two civil cases that a
member of the bar, even with the
consent'of the parties, cannot ex-
ercise judicial power." See also
Cobb v. People, 84 Ill., 511.
Private Communications between
Judge and Jury.-It is a well es-
tablished and salutary rule, and
one very essential to the proper
and effectual administration of jus-
tice, that the instructions of the
judge to the jury should be openly
and publicly~imparted. The right
of a suitor to have the trial of his
cause conducted openly, with the
opportunity to be present and to
except to and review any unwar-
ranted instruction or procedure, is
a substantial one, and if any infrac-
tion of it occurs the burden rests
GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL.
upon the party maintaining 'the
regularity of the proceedings to
show that the communication or
act or question could not have
tended to the injury of the de-
feated party. If it appears affirma-
tively and beyofid dispute that the
instructions, instead of being preju-
dicial to the party complaining
-were really favorable, to him and
could not have worked any injus-
tice, or in any vay have affected
the result, or if the irregularity
has been cured by the waiver (see
Alexander v. Gardiner, 14 R. I., 15)
or assent of the party alleging it,
itis not a sufficient reason lor order-
ing a new trial; but it may be
stated generally that the party
moving for a reversal is not re-
quired to show affirmatively that
the communication tended to his
hurt, the principle underlying the
rule being that such communica-
tions are so dangerous and impoli-
tic that it should be presumed con-
clusively that harm was done. The
source of the danger lies in the
secrecy attending the act. Gra-
ham and Waterman on New Trials,
Vol. II, p. 360, say: "The practice
of the courts addressing private
notes to the jury cannot be suffi-
ciently condemned." In Water-
town Bank v. Mix, 51 N. Y., 559,
the judge answered somewhat
vaguely a written question relating
to the evidence sent to him by the
iury, by writing his answer beneath
and returning it, but without in-
forming counsel. JOHNsON, C.,
said: "It is, in my opinion, better
and safer to adhere to the rule as
affirmed by the adjudged cases and
by what I understand to be the set-
tled usage in this State, that there
ought to be no communication be-
tween the judge and jury after they
have gone from the bar to consider
of their verdict, in relation to the
oral evidence or Iils instructions to
them, unless it take place openly
in court or with the express con-
sent of the parties." In Sargent
v. Roberts, I Pick., 337, the Court
said: "We are all of the opinion,
after considering the question ma-
turely, that no communication
whatever ought to take place be-
tween the judge and the jury after
the cause has been committed to
them by the charge" of the Court
unless in open court, and where
practicable in the presence of the
counsel in the case."
Wiggins v. Downer, 67 How. Pr.,
N. Y., 65, a leading case, reviews
the authorities. Here the jury re-
turned to open court at the close of
the evening session, when neither
parties nor counsel were present.
and requested the Court to repeat
certain propositions, which was
granted. The attendance of coun-
sel was impossibl. Verdict sus-
tained. See also Goldsmith v.
Solomons, 2 Groble, S. C., 296;
Rogers v." Moulthrop, 13 Wend.,
N. Y., 274.
A distinction has been drawn
between a written communication
to the jury involving law and one
involving fact. In Thayer v. Van
Vleet, 5 John., N. Y. iii, a jus-
tice's court jury while deliberating
sent for the justice, who entered
their room and answered a ques-
tion of law: Held, no such miscon-
duct as commended a new trial.
See also Allen v. Aldrich, 29 N. H.,
63; School Dist. vz. Bragdon; 23 N.
H., 517. And the judge may give
written instructions to the jury
after they have retired, at their re-
quest, upon questions of law, even
in the absence of counsel: Shapely
v'. White, 6 N. H., 172; Basset r,.
Salisbury Co., 28 N. H., 438. But
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* in Plunkett v. Appleton, 5 rHow.
Pr., N. Y. 469, a verdict was set
aside because the judge, without
the knowledge of codnsel, sent
written communications to the
jury answering questions of law
addressed to him by the jury. A
reversal was allowed in Bunn v.
Croul, io Johns., N. Y., 239, where
the question was one of fact and
not a matter of law. See also
Mahoney v. Decker, 18 Hun., N.
Y., 365. In Neil v. Abel, 24 Wend.,
N. Y., 185, the judge was reversed
because he permitted the jury,
without the consent of the parties,
to use his minutes sent for by them.
Similiter, State v. Alexander, 66
Mo., 148.
In Shapely -v. White, PARkER,
J., said: "The principle to be de-
duced from these cases seems to be
a sound one. If the jury, after an
adjournment, put a question. re-
specting the facts of the case to the
court, it will be irregular to -state
the evidence relating to it; but if
they desire instruction upon a
mere question of law, that may be
answered. It should undoubtedly
be* answered in such a way that the
parties may have an opportunity
to have it corrected if there is any
error in the answer, and in this
way all the rights of both parties
are secured as effectually as if the
answer was given in open court."
In Taylor v. Betsford, 13 Johns.,
N. Y., 487, the justice went into
the jury room and deliberated with
them privately and apart from the
parties and without their consent.
Judgment reversed. SeealsoBenson
v. Clark, r Con. (N. Y.), 258. The
Court, in Hobery v. State, 3 Minn.,
262, said: ' A judge has no more
right to communicate with a jury
after it has retired than iny other
person, and we must look upon his
visit in this case in the same light
that we would view the entry of
any third person into the jury
room while the jury was in consul-
tation." The Court, in Wiggins v.
Downer, 67 How. Pr., N. Y., 65,
said: "From these cases and others
of like character that might be
cited, dt is clear that a judge should
not privately communicate with
the jury, either by entering the
room where they are deliberating "
or by means of written communi-
cations. The principle upon which
thp rule rests is that such com-
munications are so dangerous and
impolitic that they will be con-
clusively presumed to have influ-
enced the jury improperly. The
source of the danger is the secret
nature of communication." But
see Thayer V. Van Vleet, 5 Johns.,
N. Y., iii.
Intoxication oftheJudge.-Such
culpable decorum is uiidoubtedly
ground for a new trial. Says the
court, in Repath v. Walker, i3
Col., io9: " It would be better to
submit questions in dispute to the
arbitration of chance than to the
decision of a tribunal which is not
thoroughly upright and scrupu-.
lously fair as between litigants;
and can it be said that an upright
judge, a scrupulously fair man, one
who appreciates the dignity of his
office, can impartially determine
the interests of litigants'and fairly'
administer the law when in a state
of intoxication. Such conduct on
the part of a judge is not only re-
prehensible, but is indeed crini-
inal."
Judicial Recognition of Scandal.
-In Rickabus v. Gott, 51 Mich.,
227, the trial judge permitted to be
admitted needless scandal and
gratuitous attacls on the character
of a party. Upon reversal the
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Supreme Court said: "There was
no color of excuse for the practice.
It was equally a violation of pro-
priety and the rules of evidence.
It was not only hearsay, but irrel-
evant, and could have no other
object than to wound and disparage
the proponent. . . . The testi-
mony had no legal connection with
the question that was being tried,
and tle end to which it was ob-
viously directed is utterly indefen-
sible. The duty of the trial judge
to repress needless scandal and
gratituitous attacks on character is
a very plain one, and good care
should be taken to discharge it
fully and faithfully."
Mfisconduct of Court toward the
Evidence.-In Belmore v. Caldwell,
2 Bibb., Ky., 76, the judge refused
counsel permission to argue a ques-
tion of fact before the jury. Upon
reversal the Supreme Court said:
'-' The right of appearing by coun-
sel and arguing matters of fact in-
volved in the cause is a right which
the Court ought not to have denied
to the party." Similiter Olds v.
Com., 3 Marsh., Ky., 467; Hunt
v. State, 49 Ga., 255.
Attitude offJudge-The manner
and demeanor of the judge which
indicates a bias and obviously in-
fluenced the jury will afford ground
for a new trial. In Wheeler v.
Wallace, 53 Mich., 355, the trial
judge apparently sanctioned an
abuse of cross-examination, the
purpose of which was to entrap a
witness into making inadverdent
statements; volunteered his own
notion of the purpose of a question;
reflected before the jury upon the
capacity and memory of counsel;
and stated as a fact,' when there
was doubt about it, that a witness
had sworn to a particular state-
ment. ChiefJustice CooLEY, upon
reversal, said: "It is very unusual
to have exception taken on writ of
error to the manner and deport-
ment of the trial judge in the
conduct of the trial, and under
ordinary circumstances a court of
review would not scrutinize very
closely his methods when no error
in his rulings, was alleged. Still,
it is possible for a judge to deprive
a party of a fair trial, even without
intending to do so, by the manner
in which he conducts the case, and
by a plain exhibition to the jury of
his own opinions in respect to the
parties or to the case."
State v. Richards, 72 1o., 17, was
reversed by the higher court be-
cause the judge's charge was pre-
judicial to the defendant as tending
to impair his credibility as a wit-
ness when it was possible for the
jury to reconcile it with the evi-
dence of other witnesses.
Remarks of Court to Counsel.-
It is misconduct, warranting a new
trial, for the Court to compliment
one attorney to the detriment of
the other, or to resort to language
which unjustljy casts a stigma upon
counsel, or where his remarks to
an attorney show an unfavorable
opinion toward either party to the
suit.
In McDuff v. Journal Co., 47 N.
W. Rep., 671, the Court said: "I
don't want to compliment Mr.
Pound (the plaintiff's attorney), but
I am well aware of the fact that
Mr. Pound knows how to try a law
suit." Judgment reversed. Upon
exceptions to the court's remarks
to counsel during trial and argu-
ment, Judge SHERWOOD, in setting
aside the verdict of Cronkhite v.
Dickerson, 51 Mich., 177, said: "It
is insisted by the defendant's coun-
sel that these suggestions by the
Court were calculated to make an
45
MISCONDUCT OF A JUDGE AS
impression unfavorable to the de-
fendant, upon the minds of thejury.
Of course, nothing of the kind was
intended by the court; still, we
think, the suggestions open to the
criticisms made by the defendant's
counsel, and it is impossible to tell
to what extent the defendant's
rights may have been prejudiced
by the remark. Certainly, the nat-
ural tendency was in that direcrion,
and in this there was error. Jurors
are very vigilant in scrutinizing all
that is said by the trial judge in the
progress of a cause before them,
and great care should be observed
that nothing is said which can, by
any possibility,'be construed to the
prejudice of either party. Courts
cannot be too circumspect in this
regard." See, also, People v. Hare,
57 Mich., 505; Mittel v. Chicago, 9
Ill. Ap., 534-
Judicial Coercion of Jury.-Lan-
guage coming from the bench, obvi-
ously tending to coerce the jury
into agreement, affords ground for
a new trial. Any improper re-
mark of the court in the presence
and hearing of the jury, liable to
influence that action is miscon-
duct.
The jury, in Green v. Telfair, ii
How. Pr., N. Y., 260, after having
been absent several hours in con-
sultation, returned into court, and
stated their inabiltty to agree. The
judge informed the jury that it was
very important that they should
agree upon a verdict; that the case
had excited considerable feeling,
which would be increased if they
should separate wlthout agreeing;
that no one juror should control
the result, or otherwise the verdict
would be the verdict of one man,
and not of the twelve; that both
parties had taken exceptions to de-
cisions made during the progress of
the trial, and it was necessary be-
fore these decisions could be re-
viewed, that there should be a ver-
dict of some kind; that for five
years he had discharged but one
jury, because they were unable to
agree, and that he would return
Monday morning to receive their
verdict. A verdict was rendered
almost instantly. HARRIS, J., in
reversing the lower court said: "A
judge may also keep the jury to- -
gether as long as in his judgment
there is any reasonable prospect of
their being able to agree; but be-
yond this I do not think "he is at
libertyto go. An attempt to influ-
ence the jury by referring to the
time they are to be kept together,
or the inconvenience to which they
are to be subjected, in case they
shall be so pertinacious as to adhere
to their individual opinions, and
thus continue to disagree, cannot
be justified. A judge has no right
- to threaten or intimidate a jury in
order to affect their deliberations.
I think he has no right even to al-
lude to his own purpose as to the
length of time they are to be kept
together. There should be nothing
in his intercourse with the jury
having the least appearance of"
duress or coercion.-
In Slater v. Mead, 53 How. Pr.,
57, the lower court said: "You
must agree upon a verdict, I cannot
discharge you until you agree upon
a verdict." The- Court of Appeal
declared that "these remarks of
the justice presiding at the trial
were such as would very probably
induce the jury to come to an agree-
ment, from a desire to escape longer
confinemept. . . . The verdict
cannot be said to be the judgment
of the jury, acting "without re-
straint, andin the discharge of their
obligations, to render a true verdict
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according to the evidence, and,
therefore, it ought not to stand."
See, also, Phoenix Insurance Co. v.
Moog, 81 Ala., 335. The inferior
court was reversed in R. R. Co. v.
Jackson, 81 Ind., i9, for sending
word by the bailiff to the jury that
"if they do not agree to a verdict
I will keep them there until Satur-
day," that was to say four days.
The reversal in Fushman v. Mayor,
54 Ala., 263, was based on a remark
by the judge to the jury that the
proceeding "was a civil suit, but if
the jury considered the evidence
they would find it decidedly crim-
inal." The higher court said "we
cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
juries . . . watch with anxiety
to gather from the court some
intimation as to what the judge
thinks should be their finding."
Upon the jury stating their ina-
bility to find a verdict, in State v.
Ladd, i La. An.; 27 r , thejudge said
that the case was one of peculiar
character, and that he "had reason
to believe from information re-
ceived that some of the jury had
been approached and tampered
with previous to the trial." Held,
that such remarks had a tendency
to coerce the jury into a verdict,
from improper motives, and was
sufficient grounds for remanding
the case for a new trial.
State v. Bybee, 17 Kan., 462, is
an exhaustive case. The defence
was alibi. The court intimated to
a divided jury that a reflection
would be cast upon them if they
did not agree; that there should be
concession in matters of detail and
minor importance; that they should
bring their minds together, as an
apothecary mixes different ingre-
dients and ascertains the product,
and that they need not hope to be
discharged for a long time. BROWN,
J., in a learned opinion said " the
general impression of these instruc-
tions is that the jury ought by
compromise and surrender of indi-
vidual convictions, of necessity to
come to an agreement, and that a
failure to do so would be an impu-
tation upon both jury and court.
No juror should be influ-
enced to a verdict by fear of perso-
nal disgrace or pecuniary injury.
No juror should be induced to agree
to a verdict by a fear that a failure
to so agree would be regarded by
the public as reflecting upon either
his intelligence or his integrity.
Personal considerations should
never be permitted to influence his
conclusions, and the thought of
them should never be presented to
him as a motive for action. Nor
do we think the illustration given
by the learned court a happy one.
. . We are constrained to be-
lieve that he passed beyond the
line which should limit the counsel
and instructions of a court to a
jury that thereby the material
rights of the defendant were preju-
diced."
In Spearman v. Wilson, 44 Ga.,
473, a judge threatened to carry a
juryinto another county, where he
was about to hold court, if they did
not agree. The Supreme Court set
aside the verdict.
C. J. JACKSON, in Physioe v. Shea,
75 Ga., 466, said: "The new trial
was properly granted (by the Supe-
rior Court) on the ground that the
court erred in his remarks to the
jury, in regard to allowing them
their meals only at their own ex-
pense, after they had been out all
night without supper or breakfast.
It operated as a threat to starve
such as had no money into finding-
a verdict, for in ten minutes, after
being hung all night, they agreed
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on a verdict. The old idea of starv-
ing juries to coerce a verdict has
passed away." See, also, Hancock
v. Blam, 3 Baxter (Tenn.), 33.
The circuit judge, in R. R. Co. v.
Barlow, 86 Tenn., 537, upon the
jury's report of disagreement, said,
that it seemed "to be a very diffi-
cult matter for juries at the present
term of the court to decide ques-
tions of-fact submitted to them ;"
that it seemed to the court that
"nearly every jfiry had returned
and said they could not agree;" that
they "ought to agree and decide
cases, for they had to be decided by
juries; " and that he had no idea of
discharging them, but would keep
them together on the case "during
the entire term, if it lasted three
weeks," "unless they sooner agreed
upon it. Held, reversible error.
In Wannak v. Mayor of Macon,
53 Ga., 163, the trial judge said:
"Why, gentlemen of the jury, I
saw that Christmas exhibition my-
self, and was alarmed, but I am not
a witness in this case, and was not
at the firing, and I know nothing
about how the fire occurred on
Cherry Street, nor intimate my
opinion;" and the judge further
expresses an opinion that certain
testimony was" of but little value."
WARREN, C. J., said thi remarks
of the court "were erroneous and
improper." Judgment reversed.
In 'charging the jury in Hair z.
Little, 28 Ala., 236, that they might
give exemplary damages if the tres-
pass was accompanied with circum-
stances of aggravation, the judge
playfully remarked, in the way of
illustration, "such damages as
would teach the old gentleman not
to violate the Sabbath, nor injure
his health by riding in the night,
nor interfere with the rights of
others." CHELTON, C. J., said the
remark "was calculated to impress
them (the jury) with the belief that
the judge thought the facts such
as would require them to give ex-
emplary damages." Verdict set
aside. See, also, Moncallo v. State,
12 Tex. Ap., 171.
Bowman v. State, 19 Neb., 523,
was a peculiar case. The defendant,
when arraigned for a felony, moved
for a continuance, on the ground
of absence of witnesses, including
his father. Whereupon the judge,
in the presence of certain of the
regular panel of petit jurors, some
of whom afterwards sat in the trial
of the cause, said that the father
told him that he would have noth-
ing to do with the defendant; that
the defendant had committed per-
jury, and that E" grand jury would
be called. upon to investigate the
same, CoBn, J., said, "It may be
granted that such declarations
or expressions of the court did
not cause the future juror to
form or express an opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused ; but it did prevent him from
entering the jury box with his mind
a tabula rasa, so far as the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner was con-
cerned, whether he was himself
aware of what had been written
thereon or not." Reversed and
remanded.
In Taylor v. Jones, 2 Head
(Tenn.), 565,'the lower court made
the following remark: "There are
some cases in which I have been
sometimes, in case of hung juries,
almost been constrained to tell the
jury that it would be better for them
to find a wrong verdict than not to
agree at all, as any error we may
commit may be corrected by the
Supreme Court ."
The Supreme Court, per CARUTH-
URS, J,, said: "The effect of such
